Epistemic status of agents ​

We have already discussed the epistemic status of statements - how confident you are in a particular statement about the world. Now we can talk about the epistemic status of an agent - a list of the epistemic statuses of all statements about the world that the agent can sensibly formulate.

It is important to remember that not all agents describe the world with the same set of statements.

Example: I may believe that A, B, and C, while Vladimir believes that A, B, and D, and someone else finds it nonsensical.

Furthermore, there may be different opinions on the truth of the statements that we have formulated in the same way.

Thus, there is a piece of reality, your statements, to which you assign some truthfulness/confidence status. Others also assign some status to them - they express different opinions about the same statements. The enumeration of an agent's opinions on the statements that shape our piece of the world is their epistemic status.

You have an idea of what is happening in the minds of other agents - their epistemic status. You may not know for sure what Vladimir thinks of your work, but you assume - you have an opinion about it. For example, you think that you are a good programmer. And you also think that Vladimir thinks about you that you are a good programmer. Or you have reason to believe that Vladimir does not consider you a good programmer.

You can confirm (or, conversely, waver) in your perception without directly asking the agents. Every piece of information you exchange with agents changes your perception of their epistemic status in your mind. And of your epistemic status in their minds.

With each new piece of information, your view of the world can change. But primarily, your view of what another person thinks about the world will change.

Example: I say that the sky is blue. First of all, your perception of what I think about the sky is updated. If you trust me as an expert in the field of the sky, then your perception of the sky is updated. But if you don't trust me, there is no "after" in this scenario. So, my epistemic status changes in your mind, but your view of the world remains the same.

The absence of information exchange can also be information that changes your perception of what other people think. For example, you ask me about the color of the sky. And I remain silent, providing no information. And you start to wonder why I am silent. Maybe I don't know the color of the sky? Maybe I've never been outside? Maybe I don't consider myself an expert? Maybe I didn't understand the question?

By asserting certain answers to these questions, you change my epistemic status in your mind and formulate a myriad of new statements about the world.

A meta-model with beliefs/assertions and their role/function in forming explanations will be introduced in the next section.

When I provide an explanation to a person, I expect that a much larger piece of their epistemic status will change in a chain than if I simply try to list the consequential statements through which I want them to change their epistemic status.